Aid for Trade (AfT) has gained prominence as an innovative form of donor support in the 'post' Washington Consensus. AfT mechanisms have been praised as a means of aligning trade liberalisation deals (whether in the Doha Round or within bilaterals) to poverty reduction objectives. This article, through critical analysis of AfT discourse within the 'moral economies' of multilateral WTO and bilateral EU-ACP negotiations, points to the strategic purposes of donor language in rationalising asymmetric North-South trade systems. Moreover, it questions the 'development' credentials of AfT assistance by examining some of the ensuing private sector activities and the impact on the supposed beneficiaries, and the tying of AfT disbursements to the implementation of inappropriate policies.
Introduction
Aid for Trade (AfT) has gained prominence in donor efforts to eradicate poverty in the global South. Aimed at supporting developing countries' economic capacity through assistance to trade governance, the creation of enabling infrastructure and the facilitation of private sector development (PSD), AfT mechanisms are hailed as a means of levelling the economic playing field between donors and recipients. Moreover, AfT instruments are lauded as a means of enhancing the well-being of the poorest within developing societies -since increased trade will bring about livelihood creation and 'trickle-down' prosperity for vulnerable citizens. In short,
AfT support is understood to facilitate low-income states' successful integration into global free markets, making 'globalisation work for the poor' through job creation, and establishing a prosperous tax base conducive to wider social improvements (OECD 2007: 11; Orbie 2008: 47) .
This espousal and dissemination of 'pro-poor' norms within AfT programmes, meanwhile, strongly aligns with donor attempts to enact a 'post'-Washington Consensus in their approach to international development. As Weber (2010: 112) , explains 'the post-Washington Consensus has had an explicit poverty and development focus... [T] his normative refocusing... has justified enhanced efforts of policy coordination and policy harmonisation between key global institutions and actors'. In this context, and acknowledging the regressive consequences of donor-sponsored laissez-faire policies upon the social fabric of low-income states under structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the donor community has promised to combine 'second-generation' liberalisation in developing countries with necessary transitional assistance (Easterly 2001: 21; Stiglitz and Charlton 2006: 3; OECD 2009: 1) . AfT instruments are, accordingly, viewed as a means of bridging liberalisation to legitimising poverty reduction 4 objectives, providing the means through which developing countries can fairly compete in open markets. AfT mechanisms, in this vein, act as a bulwark of a moralised post-Washington Consensus, providing tangible evidence of donors' willingness to 'learn the lessons' of the past and to lubricate developing countries' 'smooth and gradual' entry into globalised markets (Langan 2011: 88) .
Given the strategic function of AfT programmes in the 'post' Washington Consensus, it is necessary to critically evaluate AfT instruments and assess whether they are genuinely delivering a level-playing-field conducive to the well-being of 'the poor'. In particular, it is necessary to explore the functions of AfT discourse in rationalising liberalisation agendas and in cementing 'common sense' understandings of the need for open markets in an era of globalisation (cf. Bieler and Morton 2004; Bruff 2009) . In this task, it is relevant to contrast the strategic significance of AfT discourse with the material outcomes of AfT instruments for developing countries. Namely, it is illustrative to contrast the development narratives embodied within AfT programmes with the tangible implications of specific AfT assistance for improving local infrastructure, enhancing trade governance capacity, and for promoting PSD.
This article, accordingly, applies a critical moral economy perspective concerned with potential 'normativity-outcomes gaps' between the discourse of AfT mechanisms and their material impact (Sayer 2007; Polanyi 1959; E.P Thompson 1979; Gramsci 2007) . It considers the role of AfT discourse in embedding pro-poor norms within North-South trade systems, imbuing these systems with apparent legitimacy. Drawing from the moral economy approach, the article then considers how moral norms may be overridden by geopolitical and/or commercial interests pursued by donor institutions. Specifically, the article provides an analysis of AfT discourse and interventions in relation to (i) the moral economy of WTO Doha Round negotiations, and (ii) the moral economy of EU bilateral trade relations with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. In both cases, the article examines the strategic functions of moralised AfT 5 narratives in furthering liberalisation within the auspices of the post-Washington Consensus, and the disjuncture between these narratives and material outcomes for 'the poor'.
The article is structured as follows. The first section introduces a moral economy perspective and examines the relevance of this critical approach for an understanding of AfT programmes within the post-Washington Consensus. The second section then examines AfT instruments in the context of ongoing WTO negotiations for further liberalisation in NorthSouth trade, with a focus on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Thereafter the third section considers the role of AfT mechanisms within ACP-EU relations with a focus on development discourses and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Finally, the conclusion recaps the lessons of a moral economy analysis of AfT measures amidst concerns surrounding the normativity-outcomes gap between discourse and material outcomes for 'the poor'.
Moral Economy & the 'post' Washington Consensus
Moral political economy is an emerging sub-discipline within the broader field of political economy that examines how moral norms relating to the 'rules' of economic life often contrast, in regressive fashion, with actual economic outcomes in relation to human well-being/ill-being.
Articulated by Andrew Sayer (2000; and drawing upon a longer critical tradition set by Antonio Gramsci, Karl Polanyi, and E.P. Thompson, moral political economy maintains that 'economic activity presupposes the establishment of moral economic norms… even where, as in the case of capitalist property rights and the capitalist labour-relation, they [economic relations] are products of unequal power, there are generally attempts to legitimise them as just and fair' (Sayer 2004: 5) . Moreover, a moral economy approach seeks to discern possible normativityoutcomes gaps as ostensible norms are materially breached within operating 'moral economies'; and to examine how asymmetrical economic relations may be insulated from reform due to the construction of 'common sense' understandings of how economic processes ought to function. In 6 this vein, a moral economy perspective offers a critical approach towards the study of economic life that seeks not merely to criticise injustices but to understand how they arise and how they are perpetuated within operating economic structures. A moral economy critique in this sense can be 'distinguished from mere criticism by the fact that it tries not only to identify false beliefs and the practices they inform but why those false beliefs are held' (Sayer 2009: 770) . That is, its focus on the normative underpinnings of economic structures helps to unveil the ways in which moral discourses/norms may establish progressive images of economic exchange that downplay and obscure 'real' material consequences for human well-being (see Wiegratz 2010 for an application of this concerning Uganda's post-1986 neo-liberal turn). Dominant 'common sense' understandings of economic processes and their ostensible 'progressive' outcomes may veil arising disjunctures between embedded norms and actual material effects.
As noted above, a moral economy perspective draws upon a number of critical traditions within broader political economy. Notably, a moral economy analysis owes intellectual debt to Antonio Gramsci's examination of hegemony and 'common sense'. As Gramsci explained in a Marxian framework, dominant groups (as the beneficiaries of exploitative modes of economic relations) do not merely maintain economic systems through material force. Instead, they secure economic structures through a blend of what, in contemporary academic parlance, might be termed hard, coercive power and soft, persuasive power. The exercise of hegemony on the part of dominant elites is thereby tied to 'ethico-political' struggles 'characterised by the combination of force and consent'. This presupposes that the elite must take account 'of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised' and that they must gain ascendance not only in the economic but also in the cultural sphere (Gramsci 2006: 85-86) . In addition, it presupposes that 'human social practice is... conditioned by the values, norms and beliefs, that comprise any conception of how to organise production' (Bruff 2009: 346) . In this context, Gramsci argues that an intellectual cadre plays a key hegemonic role by (re)inventing 7 moral legitimisations of the status quo as part of common sense understandings of how economic systems ought to function. Common sense, for Gramsci (2007: 419) , is understood as 'the "philosophy of non-philosophers", or in other words the conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man [sic] is developed'. That is, it is understood as commonly held assumptions as to how the world does, and ought to, function according to dominant moral 'truths'. In this construction of common sense, the 'organic' intellectuals (since they arise 'organically' from within dominant groups) co-opt ideas emanating from sources of dissent and act as 'perpetual persuaders' in the maintenance of the moral fabric of prevailing economic regimes (cf. Bruff 2009: 346-347) . This cements common acceptance of the status quo and insulates dominant groups from opposition. Importantly, however, Gramsci's focus on the power of ideas avoids the ontological 'idealism' that has been attributed to the treatment of ideas in social constructivist and post-structuralist frameworks. As Bieler and Morton (2008: 122) make clear, (neo)Gramscian analysis seeks to examine 'the material structure of ideas' in terms of the dialectic between 'ideas and material social conditions'. Within a historical-materialist prism, it examines how certain values come to dominate, who seeks to propagate them, and for what political purposes (ibid). As such, the organic intellectuals' construction of common sense is not treated in isolation but is contextualised and informed by a broader understanding of the material modes of production in which dominant groups become ascendant. A Gramscian perspective, accordingly, considers how ideational power interacts with, and responds to, material historical events (for instance, economic crises or, indeed, trade negotiations) as elites seek to manage ongoing consent. Ideas and material factors are in constant interplay, with the exercise of hegemony (allegedly) neither reduced to a crude social constructivism or to what Gramsci (2007: 233) termed an 'iron economic determinism'.
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Importantly, a moral economy approach also owes significant intellectual debt to the works of E.P Thompson and Karl Polanyi. E.P Thompson (again working within a Marxian framework) popularised academic usage of the term moral economy in his examination of English mass protests in the eighteenth century. Criticising historical analyses that represented popular uprisings as animalistic reactions propelled by hunger or rage, E.P Thompson (1971: 79) demonstrated how the English commons held 'a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor'. Accordingly, when protest did erupt -for instance in opposition to grain hoarding -it did so from the crowd's understandings that presupposed norms within the popular 'moral economy' had been unfairly infringed. Hence economic systems, for E.P. Thompson, were built upon ethical norms relating to fair-play between economic agents. When these norms were infringed by unscrupulous economic actors, then popular protest could emerge as part of attempts to restore the 'moral economy' (Thompson 1971: 71; 79) . This analysis, meanwhile, was foreshadowed by Karl 'Moral economy' may sound like an oxymoron because economic behaviour is strongly associated with power and the pursuit of self-interest, and economic forces often act regardless of moral concern. Nevertheless, all economic institutions are founded on norms defining rights and responsibilities that have legitimations (whether reasonable or unreasonable), require some moral behaviour of actors, and generate effects that have ethical implications (Sayer 2007: 262) .
With echoes of Gramsci, he further explains that 'we can acknowledge the partial autonomy of market forces as real (real 'abstractions') while arguing that they can never completely escape their dependence on non-market and non-economic processes or aspects of social life' (Sayer 2004: 3) . In this context, his moral economy perspective examines how economic structures are instituted in relation to moral norms, how the sentiments of economic agents are shaped by ethics, and examines whether the material outcomes of economic activities align with ostensible normative drivers (Sayer 2007: 262-266 ).
Sayer's moral economy approach, however, departs both from Polanyian analysis of embeddedness/disembeddedness as well as the 'class reductivism' of Marxian perspectives (1995: 185) . While citing Polanyi's work as an influential contribution to understandings of the historical contexts of market structures, Sayer (2004: 2-7) , nevertheless, disputes the efficacy of the 'embeddedness' metaphor on two main grounds. First, he convincingly argues that the metaphor fails to capture the ways in which modern liberal elites do in fact seek to legitimise free markets in relation to social mores. Second, he claims that the Polanyian metaphor may lead to assumptions that moral sentiments are 'externally' constructed by society in a dichotomous relationship with 'markets' whereas, in reality, norms concerning legitimate economic activity are often 'internally' shaped by primary economic agents (2004: 2; 4).
In relation to Marxian frameworks, meanwhile, Sayer (1995: 185-188) persuasively argues against what he describes as an analytical '"class reductivism" in which [material] processes largely attributable to division of labour and modes of coordination are attributed to capitalist social relations of production'. He explains that the economic status of workers in capitalist society cannot be explained solely in terms of a 'lack of ownership of the means of production' since a variety of other factors, including technological change and consumer preference, impact upon their (in)security. Moreover, many of these variable economic factors -such as potential clashes of interest between the needs of producers and the needs of consumers -would (and did) exist in market-socialist models -hence they are not reducible to capitalist social relations of production. Combined with this, Sayer also makes clear that Marxian analysis often mistakenly attributes domination to the capitalist form of the state, rather than to the functions of the state itself:
The problems of state action in capitalist society do not derive only from the fact that it is a capitalist state -or indeed, a patriarchal or racist state; they also derive from the fact that it is a state. Whether capitalist or not, states inevitably have to regulate, discipline, tax, and undertake surveillance of individuals, with good and bad effects (1995: 196) .
Sayer also rightly recognises that Marxian analysis of domination often fails to fully consider nonclass avenues of repression, for instance, those based on homophobia, racism, misogyny, and/or nationalism (Sayer 1995: 185-186) . Thus while some parallels do exist between the work of Sayer on the one hand and the critical analysis of Antonio Gramsci and E.P Thompson on the other, nevertheless, his moral economy perspective is post-Marxian. This is particularly important since Sayer's critique is applicable to neo-Gramscianism.
This school of analysis often falls into the 'class reductivism' that Sayer warns against. Huw Macartney (2008: 432) , for example, in an attempt to anchor the neo-Gramscian school more firmly to orthodox Marxist analyses of material forces, argues that only in times of crisis do opportunities arise for organic intellectuals to meaningfully (re)work the conceptual basis of economic structures. At all other times, he maintains that capitalist systems function due to the 'primacy of certain material phenomena' (that is, the capitalist mode of production and the class dynamic). In this context, he explicitly refutes interpretations of Gramscianism in which ' "ideas, It is important to note, however, that Sayer's articulation of a moral economy approach does not sufficiently engage Gramsci's conception of common sense in terms of the ongoing construction of consent, which is necessarily at the heart of a moral economy analysis; nor does he sufficiently consider how discourse analysis is tied to a moral economy critique. Indeed, a moral economy perspective is inevitably bound to discourse analysis in order to consider how norms are (re)embedded within economic systems, and how common sense acceptance of economic structures is constructed. As Goodman (2004: 907) argues in his own moral economy analysis of the Fairtrade movement, norms are (re)created within 'discursive fields' in which common sense understandings of economic life are established. In this process, the narratives of economic actors serve to (re)embed norms within economic systems, imbuing them with legitimacy and facilitating public acceptance. A moral economy assessment of AfT mechanisms must therefore be attuned to the ways in which: the politics of (international) development is implicated in both a discourse and the practices that legitimate and reproduce certain core assumptions of global politics, which themselves render the conditions for the reproduction of specific constitutional features conducive to the organisation of capitalism on a global scale' (Weber 2004: 189) .
Moreover, qua Fairclough (1989: 37) , it must reflect the fact that 'discourse is the favoured vehicle of ideology, and therefore of control by consent'. Namely, that moralised AfT discourses, in their embedding of legitimising 'pro-poor' norms, may serve ideological purposes in the sense of bolstering dominant world-views and (moralised) common sense acceptance of the economic status quo.
In this context, it is illustrative to examine the role of AfT discourse in solidifying common sense understandings of the moral purposes of North-South trade in the 'post' Washington Consensus. Common sense here may apply not only to 'external' observers of economic systems in terms of the general public but, crucially, to 'internal' economic officials involved in the (re)creation of North-South trade regimes. Accordingly, it is useful to consider how donor institutions, notably the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Moreover, the AfT agenda studiously avoids the issue of structural inequalities. AfT is premised on the need to integrate developing countries further into the global trade system and finds the causes of their adverse integration to be found in domestic constraints. In this way, it establishes the moral economy of the DDA, linking its free trade objectives to common sense 'pro-poor' objectives. In reality, however, many developing countries, including many LDCs, are highly integrated into the trade system already -notwithstanding AfT and the DDA. SubSaharan Africa as a whole has a higher trade to GDP ratio than the US and the EU, and the same as that of Japan.
1 More importantly, the way in which the moralised discourse surrounding
AfT identifies the lack of benefits developing countries accrue despite this trade integration as being due to domestic infrastructural and trade capacity constraints serves to divert attention from other factors, for example the WTO's flawed negotiating rules. WTO negotiations are highly exclusionary, with the most important negotiations taking place between a select group of the most powerful countries (see, for example, Jawara and Kwa 2004). Though AfT supposedly plays an important role in increasing the capacity of many poor countries to formulate trade policy and to redress supply-side constraints, this will do little to help them in bringing about more favourable WTO agreements when they are excluded from the core negotiating forums.
Second, AfT objectives to provide assistance to developing countries to implement their WTO obligations is of questionable benefit when those obligations are frequently inappropriate and deleterious to their development. For example, for many countries TRIPs imposes levels of intellectual property protection that are inappropriate to their levels of development (Wade 2003) and fail to reflect their intellectual property priorities (Finger and Schuler 2000) . Similarly, TRIMs cuts out the opportunities to use key elements of the investment strategies used by, among others, the Asian tigers, such as requirements on foreign direct investment for local content, exports and technology sharing (Rodrik 2004: 32-35; Wade 2003) . Assisting developing countries to understand and implement the obligations of such agreements through trade related assistance -a core element of AfT -does nothing to address the inequities of the rules themselves.
To summarise, AfT discourse has played a strategic role in the construction of common sense acceptance of trade liberalisation within the DDA in alignment with the broader auspices of the post-Washington Consensus. Applying a moral economy perspective, it is clear that 'the economic cannot be understood in abstraction from the social and the cultural' (Sayer 2004: 2) .
WTO negotiations are not constructed solely in terms of material interests but are shaped by ideational and moral concerns relating to poverty reduction and fair treatment of the global South. In this process, the pursuit of second-generation liberalisation in low-income states is legitimised to both 'internal' economic actors (trade officials from the global North and South) and 'external' observers (the public) as a natural process aimed at making globalisation work for the poor. Rich nations within the WTO utilise AfT discourse to adapt the 'morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production' (Gramsci 2007: 241) . That is, officials from the global North manipulate and (re)create legitimising conceptions of morally just liberalisation via AfT narratives that appeal to popular sentiments concerning poverty alleviation. This is in spite of the materially regressive consequences of premature liberalisation for developing countries. The pursuit of (unjust) trade liberalisation is 'characterised by the combination of force and consent... the attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority' (Gramsci 2006: 86) .
Aid for Trade and ACP-EU relations: Putting 'Partnership' into EPAs
AfT has also played a highly influential role in legitimising premature trade liberalisation within bilateral ACP-EU ties. AfT discourse has rationalised the European Commission's pursuit 
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ultimately reviewed by British company TRL. This prominent highway project has heavily criticised for extensive delays and for its poor quality construction due in part to the alleged usage of sub-standard materials (Observer 2008) . Thus while European firms received a significant proportion of allocated 'AfT' road-building monies in this Ugandan case, the material outcomes of the project for poorer producers and workers remains in significant doubt.
Moreover, when the geographies of EU-funded road construction projects are considered it becomes clear that 'the EU operates with an air of commercial interests' (Fiott 2010: 10) . For instance, in Kenya road-building is concentrated towards connecting agricultural producers to the ports, and hence securing around €596 million worth of food imports emanating from Kenya to European consumers per annum (Fiott 2010: 10) . This sits awkwardly with the fact that Kenya is considered to be a net food importing country (WTO 2012). 
Conclusion
This article has considered the value of a moral economy perspective in the critical assessment of Aid for Trade programmes in the 'post' Washington Consensus. Engaging the work of Andrew
Sayer within a broader intellectual tradition set by Antonio Gramsci, Karl Polanyi, and E.P.
Thompson, it has examined how markets are instituted in relation to moral norms concerning just forms of economic relations. Accordingly, it has argued that 'economic activity presupposes the establishment of moral economic norms… [E]ven where… [economic relations] are products of unequal power, there are generally attempts to legitimise them as just and fair' (Sayer 2004: 5) .
Moreover, the article has argued that it is necessary for 'critical' approaches to political economy to critique these instituted 'moral economies' in terms of potential disjunctures between ostensible normative drivers and actual material outcomes. It has also pointed to the need to understand, qua Gramsci, how 'common sense' understandings of the (ostensible) moral nature of economic processes are discursively constructed, and how dominant moral discourses may insulate exploitative systems from necessary reform. Crucially, however, the article has pointed to emergent normativity-outcomes gaps between AfT discourse and its implications for 'the poor'. While common sense understandings of morally legitimate market-opening agendas have bolstered internal (official) and external (public) support for liberalisation, nevertheless, professed norms have been materially overridden by the commercial and geopolitical interests of the donor community. Notably, in the case of the DDA, AfT discourse has worked to dissipate developing countries' fears as to the impact of liberalisation. Commitments of AfT enabled the DDA to be presented as an equitable forum for the achievement of 'win-win' trade liberalisation and as a 'development' enterprise. However, poverty eradication does not seem to be forthcoming. Instead, unjust trade regimes are solidified and alternative development strategies are marginalised.
Similarly, in the case of ACP-EU negotiations for EPAs, AfT discourse has played a crucial part in presenting the shift from non-reciprocal to 'reciprocal' trade as a beneficial shift towards a more balanced relationship between the EU and former colonies. Claiming to address ACP countries' concerns as to their competitiveness within liberalised markets, AfT instruments reupholster the moral economy of ACP-EU relations and promote pro-poor images of EPAs.
However, the development credentials of AfT measures implemented by the EU are doubtful. 
